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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Vendor and Purchaser-Statute of Frauds-Sufficiency
of Memorandum.
The existence of some fifty cases before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on the question of the sufficiency of a writing within the meanin,-
of the Statute of Frauds1 is evidence of the difficulty and the continuing
importance of the subject. The frequency with which the problem has
recurred on appeal suggests the difficulty of prediction with which the
lawyer is confronted. This note was undertaken with the hope that a
study of the cases would lead to the discovery of some more or less
predictable rules. The hope has not been justified by the study. How-
ever, it is felt that a statement of available generalities, with a frank
recognition of their limitations, along with the collection of cases on
the point, will prove of some value to the practicing attorney.
The cases seem to group themselves around three general problems:
(1) the sufficiency of the written description of the land to be con-
veyed;
(2) the necessity of the statement of the consideration and the price;
(3) the sufficiency of signing.
(1) The cases uniformly announce the uselessly vague formula that
the land to be conveyed must be described with "reasonable certainty."2
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §988. "All contracts tot sell or convey any
lands, tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them . . . shall
be void unless said contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person
by him thereto lawfully authorized."
' (a) The following descriptions, with the aid of parol testimony, were held
sufficient: Mizell v. Burnett, 49 N. C. 249 (1857) (letter stating: "You can have
my timber on the tract of land, known as the Walling tract, on Roanoke River
. . . ") ; Carson v. Ray, 52 N. C. 609 (1860) ("My house and lot in the town of
Jefferson") ; Phillips v. Hooker, 62 N. C. 193 (1867) (memorandum to effect that
agent agreed for "Mrs. Hooker to make a deed for her house and lot north of
Kinston to the said J. R. Phillips . . ."); Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C. 293
(1883) ("Received of G. T. five hundred dollars on account of the sale of my in-
terest in the 'Lenoir lands,' owned by myself and J. W. T.") ; Gordon v. Collet,
102 N. C. 532, 9 S. E. 486 (1889) ("Beginning at a stake on Grant's comer running
north with the Rocky Ford road to Tate's line ... and then with said line to the
beginning; containing 114 acres, more or less"; on the same piece of paper: "Re-
ceived of Austin Collett $33, in part payment on a lot on Rocky Ford road . . ."
"M. C. Avery." On the opposite side of same paper: "I, Austin Collett, promise
to pay Mrs. M. C. Avery 53 dollars on a lot adjoining W. Grant's on the Rocky
Ford road, by March 1, 1886. Austin Collett"); Falls of Neuse Manufacturing
Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S. E. 568 (1890) (land on which vendee "now
lives") ; Love v. Harris, 156 N. C. 88, 72 S. E. 150 (1911) (note made by auc-
tioneer on back of notice of sale of lands to -the effect, "Sold to C. J. for $1,50022
January, 1910") ; Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N. C. 470, 73 S. E. 133 (1911) ("Re-
ceived of W. E. Bateman $5, to confirm the bargain on the purchase of the farm
on which I now live . . .") ; Lewis v. Murray, 177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750 (1918)
("Received on account of trade on home place one hundred dollars. From D. B.
Lewis"); Buckham Land and Timber Co. v. Yarbroug, 179 N. C. 335, 102 S. E.
630 (1920) (all that tract of land in two certain counties, lying on "both sides of
old road between" designated points and bounded by lands of named owners "and
others"); Norton v. Smith, 179 N, C. 553, 103 S. E. 14 (1920) -(". . . J. A. Smith
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This gives rise immediately to the problem of the admissibility of parol
evidence. It may be said generally that if a particular piece of land is
mentioned in the paper, and if parol evidence will reveal that such de-
scription refers to only one piece of land owned by the vendor, the
writing is sufficient.3 For example, under this test, a memorandum
purporting to convey the land "on which I now live" has been held
good. 4 On the other hand, if the attempted description is such that, as
revealed by parol evidence, it may apply to one or more tracts of land
owned by the vendor, the attempted conveyance is said to be within the
has sold to W. H. Norton his entire tract or boundary of land consisting of 146
acres . . .") ; Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C. 375, 104 S. E. 658 (1920) (a check
stating that it was "payment on Watts Street House") ; McCall v. Lee, 182 N. C.
114, 108 S. E. 380 (1921) (agreement by mother with her children that if they
would convey her what their father had left them, she would combine the whole
of their father's estate with the greater part of her own estate and make an equal
division to the children) ; Gilbert v. Wright, 195 N. C. 165, 141 S. E. 577 (1928)
("Agreement made ... of sale of her home property on Pennsylvania Avenue and
Cypress Street. . . .Dr. Wright agrees to buy the vacant lot from Mrs. 0. F.
Gilbert, during the month of January, 1925, for the sum of fifteen hundred dol-
lars.").
(b) The following descriptions were held insufficient and parol testimony held
inadmissible: Allen v. Chambers, 39 N. C. 125 (1845) ("Received of Mr. Drury
Allen two hundred and forty dollars, in part for a certain tract of land lying on
Flat River, including Taylor Hicks' spring-house and lot, etc., and adjoining the
land of Lewis Daniel, Womach, and others"); Plummer v. Owens, 45 N. C. 254
(1853) ("1841, W. P. to H. C. 0., Dr. To 4 loads of Rock one lot at one year's
credit, $125") ; Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858) ("Received of A. C.
Murdock ... in part payment of one house and lot in the town of Hillsboro") ;
Capps v. Holt, 58 N. C. 153 (1859) ("Received . . . of Henry Capps $100, in
part payment ... on a bargain made by us for a tract of land on the North side
of the Watery Branch, in the County of Johnston, and state of North Carolina,
containing 150 acres . . .") ; Farmer v. Batts, 83 N. C. 387 (1880) ("Received
of W. D. Farmer fourteen hundred dollars, in full payment of one tract of land,
containing one hundred acres more or less, it being the interest in two shares
adjoining the lands of James Barnes, Eli Robbins, and others") ; Breaid v. Mun-
ger, 88 N. C. 297 (1883) ("In settlement with A. E. Breaid, Kipp and Munger
owed him $316.30 to be applied to his 100 acres of land and the lot where he now




Balance due ........................................... $ 63.42
1 Jan., 1875") ; Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485,
11 S. E. 568 (1890) (bond for title to convey thirty acres of land of the "Deaver
Tract," which tract contained more than thirty acres) ; Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C.
473, 17 S. E. 539 (1893) ("19 April, 1880-James Harris has paid me $20 on his
land, owes me six more on it.").
' Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C. 293 (1883) ; Falls of Neuse Manufacturing
Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S. E. 568 (1890); Bateman v. Hopkins, 157
N. C. 470, 73 S. E. 133 (1911); Lewis v. Murray, 177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750
(1918) ; Norton v. Smith, 179 N. C. 553, 103 S. E. 14 (1920) ; Harper v. Battle,
180 N. C. 375, 104 S. E. 658 (1920). For the description used in these cases, and
for other cases, see (a) under note 2, supra.
Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S. E. 568
(1890); Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N. C. 470, 83 S. E. 133 (1911).
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prohibitions of the Statute.5 From this has evolved the familiar formula
that parol evidence is admissible to identify the land already described
in the paper, but not to a describendu.mn not already indicated therein.6
The value of such a rule is limited. Close cases make hazy the distinc-
tion between a description and an identification.7 At first glance, it
might seem that this difficulty is absolved by virtue of the presence of
another statute which reads that "in all actions for the possession of or
title to any real estate, parol testimony may be introduced to identify
the land sued for. .. ." But, whatever may have been the purpose
of this statute, it has been treated as merely reiterating the same rule
as to the admissibility of parol testimony as existed theretofore. 9 Thus
it has had no effect in the evolution of a workable formula as to what
constitutes a sufficient writing under the Statute of Frauds.
(2) A noted writer' 0 on the subject has stated that a memorandum
to be sufficient must contain all the essential elements of the agreement,
including a statement of the consideration and the price. The North
Carolina decisions are not in accord with this conclusion. It has been
held that the consideration need not appear:" in the memorandum, but
that a statement of the price must.1 2 This calls forth the explanation
that "consideration" is a much broader term than that of "price.' 3.
Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858) ; Farmer v. Batts, 83 N. C. 387
(1880) ; Fortescue v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910 (1890) ; Lowe v. Hatris,
112 N. C. 473, 17 S. E. 539 (1893). For the description used in these cases, see
(b) under note 2, supra.
'Higdon v. Rice, 119 N. C. 623, 26 S. E. 256 (1896) ; Norton v. Smith, 179
N. C. 553, 103 S. E. 14 (1920); Gilbert v. Wright, 195 N. C. 165, 141 S. E. 577
(1928).
"Carson v. Ray, 52 N. C. 609 (1860) (memorandum called for sale of "My
house and lot in the town of Jefferson," and the court held that parol evidence was
admissible to identify the land). But in Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858),
where the description was "One house and lot in Hillsboro," parol testimony was
held inadmissible, since that would be aiding the description and not identifying
land already described.
8 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1783.
'Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C. 473, 17 S. E. 539 (1893). The court said that the
Act did not change the law in reference to contracts and deeds relating to land, the
word "description" being used in this Act to mean one which has a legal suscep-
tibility of being aided by testimony so as to identify the land, not a description
which is in law no description whatever.
= POM ROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §87.
' Miller v. Irvine, 18 N. C. 103 (1834) (the court said consideration was not
part of the contract, but only the inducement to it) ; Ashford v. Robinson, 30 N. C.
114 (1847) ; Nichols v. Bell, 46 N. C. 32 (1853) ; Green v. Thornton, 49 N. C. 230
(1856) ; Kent v. Edmonston, 49 N. C. 529 (1857) ; Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C.
293 (1883) ; Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S.
E. 568 (1890); Haun v. Burrell, 119 N. C. 544, 26 S. E. 111 (1896); Peele v.
Powell, 156 N. C. 553, 73 S. E. 234 (1911); Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N. C. 470,
73 S. E. 133 (1911) ; Lewis v. Murray, 177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750 (1918).'Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904).
"In Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904), the court said:
"It is true that the consideration of the contract need not be stated .... There is
quite a difference between the price to be paid by the vendee and the consideration
necessary to support the contract and enforce it against the vendor. The latter
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There are two probable explanations for this. First, the court has ap-
plied the familiar rule that consideration may always be shown by parol
testimony. Secondly, the party "to be charged" is usually the purchaser,
and the court has said that the terms of the bargain necessary to bind
him must appear in the memorandum. Since, under the first of these
explanations, a statement of the consideration is not an essential part
of the writing, the contract is enforceable against the vendor in the
absence of a written inclusion of the consideration, but is not enforce-
able against a purchaser unless the writing contains a statement of the
price. This seems an untenable inconsistency.
(3) The provision of the statute requiring that the agreement or
memorandum thereof shall be signed "by the party to be charged" has
been interpreted by the court to require a signing only by the party
against whom the contract is sought to be enforced. 14 It follows, there-
fore, that the plaintiff who has not signed the paper, may enforce a
specific performance, although no relief could be obtained against him
on his correlative obligation. Hence the criticism that the doctrine of
mutuality of obligation is violated. 15 The cases merely exemplify the
general rule that the signing of an instrument requires the writing of
one's name with the intention thereby to authenticate the instrument.'0
These prerequisites appearing, the precise manner of inscription on the
paper is immaterial.' 7 It need not be his own name ;18 it may be writ-
ten by a third person ;19 and it may appear on any part of the instru-
ment.2
0
may be shown by parol, as at common law, and the writing ... need not contain
any matters but such as charge him, the vendor, that is, such stipulations as are to
be performed on his part. He is to convey, and the writing must be sufficient to
show that this duty rests on him as one of the parties to the contract when he is
sought to be charged. The vendee is to pay a certain price, and the writing must
likewise show his obligation-its nature and extent-when the action is against
him. It must show the price, for, otherwise, the true contract of the vendee as
to one of its essential terms would not be reduced to writing, and we could not
see from the writing what it is so as to enforce it against him. If we permitted
the vendor to supply this defect by parol proof, it would at once introduce all the
mischiefs which the statute was intended to prevent."
"Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904); Lewis v. Murray,
177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750 (1918).
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" McCall v. Textile Industrial Institute, 189 N. C. 775, 128 S. E. 349 (1925).
' Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891) (name signed by
"his mark") ; Burris v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 81 S. E. 929 (1914) (endorsement
on back of note) ; Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C. 375, 104 S. E. 658 (1920) (endorse-
ment on a check).
"Hargrove v. Adcock, 111 N. C. 166, 16 S. E. 16 (1892) (agent signing in his
own name).
" Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891) (auctioneer's sig-
nature); Proctor v. Finley, 119 N. C. 536, 26 S. E. 128 (1896) (auctioneer's
signature on notice of sale of lands) ; Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C. 64, 63 S. E.
186 (1908) (agent).
O'Burris v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 83 S. E. 929 (1914) ; Flowe v. Hartwick, 167
N. C. 448, 83 S. E. 841 (1914).
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In conclusion it may be said that the vagueness of the Statute itself
and the constantly varying fact situations which arise make impossible
the development of adequate rules as to what constitutes a sufficient
writing. Although the cases are replete with judicial utterances that
the Statute must be rigidly enforced, the court at times has been ex-
tremely lenient in upholding seemingly incomplete memoranda. This
occasional laxity may be explained in two ways. There may be unusual
hardship in the particular case. Or, the court may be seeking an in-
direct means of avoiding the strict North Carolina rule regarding part
performance.2 1
STATON P. WILLIAMS.
Workmen's Compensation-Notice to Employer-Filing of Claims-
Action Under Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Employee was killed in an accident in December, 1929, while in de-
fendant's employ. Defendant was a self-insurer and reported the acci-
dent to the industrial commission at once, offering to pay the claim.
Plaintiff, the employee's administrator, without filing a claim, notified
the defendant and the commission that he would proceed under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act rather than the Workmen's Compensation
Act. After various rulings and an appeal under the Federal Act1 the
plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 1935 the plaintiff petitioned for
an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act and requested a hear-
ing before the industrial commission. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the claim was not barred by the one year statute of
limitations as it was pending before the industrial commission during
the entire period.
2
Generally, before the injured employee or his personal representative
can recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act he
must comply with the statute in two respects. First, he must notify
the employer of the accident either within a limited time after the in-
jury or as soon thereafter as is practicable.3 While the notice is usually
'North Carolina does not allow -part performance of the contract to take the
contract without the statute. Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104
(1904); (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 48.
" Hanks v. Utilities Co., 204 N. C. 155, 167 S. E. 560 (1933).
'Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C. 312, 186 S. E. 252 (1936).
' The statutes vary in different jurisdictions. Only a few are listed below.
ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §7568 (notice to employer within 5 days; no
compensation if after 90 days); ARiz. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §1446
(injury to be reported at once); GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1933) §114-303 (no-
tice immediately; barred after 30 days unless reasonable excuse and employer
shown not to be prejudiced by delay) ; IoWA CODE (1935) §1383 (notice in 15
days; if in 30 days, not barred except as to extent employer was prejudiced; bar
absolute after 90 days) ; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll; Baldwin's Rev., 1936) §§4914,
4915 (notice as soon as practicable); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081
